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Since the paper by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), there has been a resurgence in
the debate on the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy. Speciﬁcally, there have been a grow-
ing number of empirical studies that claim that under special circumstances
contractionary ﬁscal policy may have expansionary eﬀects on consumption, in-
vestment and/or output, i.e. ﬁscal policy has non-Keynesian eﬀects. The most
cited papers within this strand of the literature are Giavazzi and Pagano (1990),
Giavazzi and Pagano (1996), Perotti (1999) and Giavazzi et al. (2000). How-
ever, there is also a growing number of studies that reject the non-Keynesian
hypothesis, and claim that one should not generalise the results by Giavazzi and
Pagano (1990). Among these papers one could mention, among others, Hjelm
(2002b), van Aarle and Garretsen (2003) and Schclarek (2003). Clearly, the
empirical results are mixed and the debate is not set yet.
On top of these mixed results, most of the cited papers have mainly focused
on the experience of industrial countries. Therefore, there is little evidence
that guarantees that the experience of industrial countries can be applied to
developing countries. Fortunately, there is an increasing interest to include the
experience of developing countries in this debate (Gavin and Perotti, 1997).
Giavazzi et al. (2000) and Schclarek (2003) are a contribution in that direction.
However, while Schclarek (2003) study the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy on private
consumption, Giavazzi et al. (2000) focus on national saving. Further, Schclarek
(2003) ﬁnds that ﬁscal policy has Keynesian eﬀects. Contrarily, Giavazzi et al.
(2000) claim that ﬁscal policy has non-Keynesian results in developing countries.
Thus, more research should be done in order to clarify this contradictory results.
The present work is an extension of Schclarek (2003) and empirically inves-
tigate the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy on private consumption for both industrial and
developing countries. Speciﬁcally, it tries to determine whether ﬁscal policy has
Keynesian or non-Keynesian eﬀects on private consumption and if this relation-
ship is aﬀected by the initial conditions of the economy. We use two variables
to determine the initial conditions of the economy, namely the interest rate that
the bonds issued by the government pay and the rate of unemployment. The use
of these two variables is the main diﬀerence with Schclarek (2003), who study
the nonlinear relationship taking into account the level of public debt and the
size of the public deﬁcit. The econometric methodology of the present study is
based on panel data estimation, using a yearly panel of thirty eight countries, of
which 19 are industrialized and 19 are developing countries. Further, the data
spans between 1970 and 2000. The sources of the data are the World Develop-
ment Indicators 2002 database of World Bank and the International Financial
Statistics 2002 database of the IMF.
The rest of the paper is organized in seven sections. Section 2 presents a short
survey of the empirical literature. The theoretical model used as a basis for the
empirical research is brieﬂy described in section 3. The empirical methodology
and the data used are discussed in sections 4 and 5 respectively. Section 6
presents the estimation results for the whole sample, the sample of industrial
countries and the sample of developing countries. In section 7, we discuss and
2present the results from some consistency test that were made in order to conﬁrm
the results from the benchmark case. Finally, section 8 concludes.
2 Survey of the literature
The literature that has evolved since the paper by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990),
have mainly tried to answer whether ﬁscal policy has Keynesian or non-Keynesian
eﬀects on economic activity. Further, it has tried to answer under which special
conditions ﬁscal policy has non-Keynesian eﬀects. According to this branch of
the economic literature, the impact of ﬁscal policy depends on: (i) the sign
of the impulse (budget cut or expansion); (ii) its size and duration; (iii) the
initial conditions (previous level or rate of growth of public debt, preceding ex-
change rate and money supply movements); (iv) the composition of the impulse
(changes in taxes and transfers relative to changes in government consumption,
changes in public investment or in social security entitlements).
Hemming et al. (2002) make an extensive survey of the theoretical and em-
pirical literature on the eﬀectiveness of ﬁscal policy in stimulating economic
activity. They conclude that in general ﬁscal policy have Keynesian eﬀects
on economic activity but that the multiplying eﬀect is small. Further, they
acknowledge the possibility of non-Keynesian eﬀects. In what follow we will
extend the review of the empirical literature made by Hemming et al. (2002)
in order to incorporate the latest results within the ﬁeld. Speciﬁcally, we will
concentrate our survey on those papers that examine cross section of countries
in order to determine the existence, or not, of expansionary ﬁscal contractions.
In general, the latest studies tend to cast doubts about the expansionary ﬁscal
contraction hypothesis.
Table 1 summarizes the main conclusions from the surveyed papers. In this
table we have also included the results of Giavazzi and Pagano (1996), Perotti
(1999), and Giavazzi et al. (2000), which are the most cited articles in the
empirical literature. The main conclusions of the surveyed studies for industrial
countries are as follow:
• The evidence tends not to support the expansionary ﬁscal contraction
hypothesis. The only exception is J¨ onsson (2004), who ﬁnds that when
ﬁscal contractions, in terms of public transfers, are large and persistent,
there are non-Keynesian results. All the other studies obtain results that
favor the view that ﬁscal policy has Keynesian eﬀects.
• Regarding the sign of the impulse, the evidence seems to favor the asymme-
try between contractions and expansions. Hjelm (2002b) ﬁnd that private
consumption grows less during contractions compared to normal periods
and that there is no diﬀerence between expansions and normal times. In
addition, J¨ onsson (2004) ﬁnds non-Keynesian eﬀects for public transfers
during contractions and Keynesian eﬀects during expansions.
• Initial conditions are not important with the exception of the preceding
exchange rate movement. Hjelm (2002a) and Hjelm (2002b) ﬁnd that
3contractions preceded by real depreciations improve consumption growth
compared to contractions preceded by real appreciations.
• With respect to the composition of the impulse, the evidence is mixed.
While van Aarle and Garretsen (2003) ﬁnd that public transfers have
clearer Keynesian eﬀects than government spending and taxes, J¨ onsson
(2004) ﬁnds that public transfers have non-Keynesian eﬀects during con-
tractions. In addition, Schclarek (2003) ﬁnds that government consump-
tion has Keynesian eﬀects while taxes do not have any eﬀects. Further,
Hjelm (2002b) concludes that the composition is not important.
• With the exception of van Aarle and Garretsen (2003), there are no stud-
ies that focus on the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy on investment. They conclude
that the ﬁndings for private consumption can be extended to private in-
vestment, i.e. ﬁscal policy has Keynesian eﬀects on investment.
Concluding, we can say that the fact that there have been episodes of expan-
sionary ﬁscal contractions, and that some episodes share certain characteristics
is not rejected. However, the surveyed papers cast doubts about the general-
ity of these results. Furthermore, as the paper by Hjelm (2002a) shows, the
preceding exchange rate movement is a key element for ﬁscal contractions to
become successful. The most cited examples of successful expansionary ﬁscal
contractions, namely Denmark (1982-1986) and Ireland (1987-1989), where all
preceded by real exchange rate depreciations. Thus, it is possible that it was
the real exchange rate depreciation that caused the consumption growth rather
than the contractionary ﬁscal policy.
When considering the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy for developing countries, the
evidence is limited to the work of Giavazzi et al. (2000) and Schclarek (2003).
Moreover, the evidence of non-Keynesian eﬀects is mixed. On one side, Giavazzi
et al. (2000) ﬁnd evidence of non-linear eﬀects of ﬁscal policy on private savings
during large changes in the surplus. Furthermore, when large changes in the
surplus are preceded by rapid debt growth, they even ﬁnd non-Keynesian ef-
fects of taxes on private savings. On the other hand, Schclarek (2003) does not
ﬁnd any evidence for developing countries that support the expansionary ﬁscal
contraction hypothesis. Furthermore, he ﬁnds that both government consump-
tion and tax shocks have Keynesian eﬀects on private consumption and that
the coeﬃcients are larger for developing countries in comparison to industrial
countries.
3 Theoretical Model
In this section we will brieﬂy outline the theoretical model that we will use as
point of reference for our empirical investigation. For a detailed treatment of the
theoretical model we make reference to Perotti (1999). The model has four basic
assumptions: ﬁrst, taxes have distortionary eﬀects; second, the government has




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6from a perfect tax-smoothing situation; third, there are two kinds of private
agents in terms of the access to the credit market, unconstrained individuals and
constrained individuals; fourth, government consumption has positive eﬀects on
economic output.
There is a fraction 1 − u of unconstrained individuals, which have perfect
access to the credit market. The fraction u of constrained individuals have
no access to the credit market. Both kinds of agents live for three periods.
The model study the change in their consumption between periods 0 and 1
due to a ﬁscal shock in period 1. Further, the response of the ﬁscal policy in
period 2 will depend on the ﬁscal shock in period 1. Therefore, ﬁscal policy
shocks will have wealth eﬀects from anticipated future responses of ﬁscal policy
for unconstrained individuals. Conversely, constrained individuals will have no
wealth eﬀects and their change in consumption between periods 0 and 1 will be
completely determined by their current income, which in turn is aﬀected by the
ﬁscal shock.
Further, Lt is the PDV of the ﬁnancing needs of the government, which is
determined by the intertemporal government budget constraint. Moreover, p
is the probability that the policy-maker currently in charge of the government
stay in oﬃce in the next period. The case when Lt is low or p is high is denom-
inated good times, and the opposite situation is called bad times. According
to this model, government consumption shocks have positive eﬀects on private
consumption at low levels of L0, the PDV of the ﬁnancing needs from the per-
spective of time 0, and negative eﬀects at high levels of it. Similarly, government
consumption shocks have positive eﬀects at high levels of p and negative eﬀects
at low levels of it. In the case of tax revenue shocks, the model predicts that
the tax shocks have the opposite eﬀects on private consumption than the gov-
ernment consumption shocks. Therefore, tax shocks have negative eﬀects at
low levels of L0, or high levels of p, and positive eﬀects at high levels of L0,
or low levels of p. These predictions of the model will be the null hypothesis
that we will empirically test. Further, the empirical model for testing the null
hypothesis will be presented in the next section.
4 Speciﬁcation and Estimation Methodology
The empirical model that we will estimate is a two-step econometric model. In
the ﬁrst step, we will estimate the ﬁscal policy innovations and the expected
change in disposable income for each country at the time. After that, we will
use the generated regressors to estimate the structural equation, which is the
model we are interested in, through panel data estimation. We will estimate
two diﬀerent structural equations: the ﬁrst one reﬂects the ﬁscal policy eﬀects
on consumption for both constrained and unconstrained individuals, and the
second reﬂects only the eﬀects on unconstrained individuals. The ﬁrst structural
equation model is
∆Cit = γ1ˆ G
it + ˜ γ1Ditˆ G
it + γ2ˆ T
it + ˜ γ2Ditˆ T
it + µ∆ˆ Yit/t−1 + ωit (1)
7where ∆Cit is the change in private consumption for country i at time t, ˆ G
ti
is the estimated shock, or innovation, in government consumption, ˆ T
it is the
estimated shock in tax revenues, Dit is a dummy variable, which will take the
value 0 in good times and the value 1 in bad times, ∆ˆ Yit/t−1 is the estimated
change in disposable income using information at time t−1, and ωit is the error
term.
The coeﬃcient γ1 measures the eﬀects of government consumption shocks on
the consumption of both constrained and unconstrained individuals. The case
when γ1 > 0 is referred as the Keynesian eﬀects of government consumption
because a positive government consumption shock has a positive eﬀect on private
consumption. Conversely, when γ1 < 0 we say that government consumption has
non-Keynesian eﬀects on private consumption. Similarly, when γ2 has a negative
sign it means that a tax shock has a negative eﬀect on private consumption.
In this case, γ2 < 0 is referred as the Keynesian eﬀect and γ2 > 0 as the non-
Keynesian eﬀect. The expansionary eﬀects of ﬁscal consolidations occur when
γ1 < 0 and/or γ2 > 0. The coeﬃcients ˜ γ1 and ˜ γ2 measure the diﬀerence in
the eﬀects of government consumption shocks and tax shocks between good and
bad times respectively.
Under the null hypothesis γ1 > 0, ˜ γ1 < 0, γ2 < 0, and ˜ γ2 > 0. Therefore,
the null hypothesis states that ﬁscal policy innovations have normally Keynesian
eﬀects on private consumption but that the Keynesian eﬀects are reduced in bad
times. Moreover, in the case that ˜ γ1 > γ1 and/or ˜ γ2 > γ2 the Keynesian eﬀects
are reverted in bad times and therefore ﬁscal policy shocks have non-Keynesian
eﬀects, i.e. the expansionary eﬀects of ﬁscal consolidations.
The second structural equation, which reﬂects the ﬁscal policy eﬀects on
consumption but only for unconstrained individuals, is
∆Cit = γu
1ˆ G




it + ˜ γu
2Dtˆ T
it + µ∆ˆ Yit/t + ˜ ωit (2)
where ∆ˆ Yit/t is the forecasted change in disposable income for country i using
information at time t. Also the u reﬂects the fact that we are only analyzing
the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy shocks on unconstrained individuals. Therefore, this
alternative approach permits us study the wealth eﬀects of unconstrained indi-
viduals which is the source of the non-Keynesian eﬀects of ﬁscal policy. Note
that the diﬀerence between equations (1) and (2) is that the ﬁrst use ∆ˆ Yit/t−1
while the second use ∆ˆ Yit/t. The diﬀerence between ∆ˆ Yit/t−1 and ∆ˆ Yit/t is that
the later use both lagged information on disposable income and the contempo-
raneous estimated ﬁscal policy innovations (Schclarek, 2003). Therefore, ∆ˆ Yit/t
incorporates the eﬀects of ﬁscal shocks on the disposable income of constrained
individuals, and thus the coeﬃcients of the ﬁscal innovations in equation (2)
reﬂects only the wealth eﬀects on consumption for unconstrained individuals
(Perotti, 1999).
Under the null hypothesis γu
1 < γ1, ˜ γu
1 = ˜ γ1 < 0, γu
2 > 0 > γ2, and
˜ γu
2 > ˜ γ2 > 0. The null hypothesis states that during normal times a govern-
ment consumption shock will have a milder eﬀect on the consumption of uncon-
strained individuals than when taking into account both kinds of individuals.
8The reason is that unconstrained individuals decide their present consumption
taking into account the PDV of income and not only their present income as
constrained individuals do. Therefore, when government consumption increase,
unconstrained individuals also take into account that in the future the tax rev-
enues of the government will have to increase to ﬁnance the current increase in
government consumption, thus having a negative wealth eﬀect. ˜ γu
1 is equal to
˜ γ1 because it is only unconstrained individuals that react diﬀerently between
bad times and good times. The reason for γu
2 being positive is that tax distor-
tions fall, and therefore the wealth of unconstrained individuals increase, when
current taxation is increased and future taxation is reduced, at the same time
that the expected PDV of taxation is constant. Further, ˜ γu
2 > ˜ γ2 > 0 because
˜ γ2 = ˜ γu
2 + ˜ γc
2 and ˜ γc
2 < 0 (Perotti, 1999).
Both equation (1) and (2) were estimated using two alternative deﬁnitions
for the dummy variable. In addition, they were estimated for the whole country
sample but also for the sub-sample of industrialized countries and the sub-
sample of developing countries. The estimation method that was used was the
ﬁxed eﬀect panel data version of the Prais-Winsten estimator.1 In all the re-
gressions we included year dummies to account for any time-speciﬁc eﬀects, i.e.
we had a two-way error component regression model. In addition, for all regres-
sions we allowed the disturbances to be heteroskedastic and contemporaneously
correlated across panels (each pair of panels has their own covariance). Further,
we speciﬁed that within panels, there was ﬁrst-order autocorrelation and that
the coeﬃcient of the AR(1) process was speciﬁc to each panel.23
As noted earlier, ˆ G
it, ˆ T
it, ∆ˆ Yit/t−1, and ∆ˆ Yit/t are generated regressors, which
are obtained from the ﬁrst-step model for each country at the time. According to
McAleer and McKenzie (1991) the presence of generated regressors results in the
covariance matrix of the disturbance term being non-spherical, with both non-
zero oﬀ-diagonal and non-constant diagonal elements. Obviously, these poses a
problem for our panel data estimation methodology, which unfortunately has
no easy solution.4 However, the estimation procedure that we used provides an
eﬃcient estimator (McAleer and McKenzie, 1991).5 Moreover, as will be clearer
1According to Beck and Katz (1995) the Prais-Winston estimator used in our regressions
produces more accurate standard errors than the commonly used feasible generalized least
square (FGLS) estimator.
2We tested our data for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation for both equation (1) and
(2) using the two dummy variable deﬁnitions. The tests performed were a modiﬁed Wald
test for groupwise heteroskedasticity and a LM test for ﬁrst-order serial correlation. For the
sample of all countries and the sub-sample of industrial countries, we found evidence of both
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation when we used the dummy variable D2t. Yet, when
we used the dummy variable D1t, we found heteroskedasticity but not autocorrelation. For
de sub-sample of developing countries, we found both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
when using both dummy variables. However, in order to take care of the ”generated regressor”
problem, we estimated all equations allowing for autocorrelation.
3We used the estimation command ”xtpcse” with the ”correlation(psar1)” option from the
statistical software Stata 7.0.
4See, for example, Pagan (1984), Murphy and Topel (1985), McAleer and McKenzie (1991),
and Smith and McAleer (1994).
5There are two broad procedures to correct the standard errors for the ”generated regres-
sor” problem. The ﬁrst procedure implies applying a joint estimation method, such as full
9when the empirical results are presented, even if we use incorrect standard errors
our main results cannot be invalidated.6
5 Data
The sample used for the estimation of the model consisted of a yearly panel of
thirty eight countries, half of them were industrialized countries and the other
half developing countries.7 The sources of the data are the World Development
Indicators 2002 database from the World Bank and the International Financial
Statistics 2002 of the IMF. A detailed description of the deﬁnitions and sources
for the diﬀerent variables used in the present study are presented in table 2. The
data span from 1970 to 2000, i.e. there are 31 observations for each country.
However, the transformations of the data and estimation procedures reduced
the span of the sample with four observations. Besides, we used unbalanced
panels because for certain countries there was not complete data for the dummy
variables.
All the variables are scaled by the lagged value of disposable income. The
procedure is described in detail in Schclarek (2003). The reason for not us-
ing the standard scaling procedure, which uses the log value of the variable, is
that there are large diﬀerences in government consumption-to-GDP and tax-to-
GDP ratios across countries and over time. Obviously a change in government
consumption will not have the same eﬀects on private consumption if the gov-
ernment consumption-to-GDP ratio is 10% as when it is 30%. Therefore just
scaling by the log diﬀerence is not appropriate in this case
As mentioned in section 4, the ﬁscal policy innovations ˆ G
it and ˆ T
it are not
readily available and had to be estimated, i.e. they are generated regressors.
In addition, the ﬁscal policy shocks have been cyclically adjusted, because we
are only interested in the discretionary variations and not the variations due
to the business cycle. The estimation method and the cyclical adjustments are
described in detail in Schclarek (2003).
In the case of the empirical construction of the regime dummy variable, Dit
takes the value 0 in good times and the value 1 in bad times. Further, as in the
theoretical model in section 3 we used two diﬀerent deﬁnitions of bad times. D1t
information maximum likelihood (FIML). The other alternative, which is the one employed
in this study, is to use a two-step estimator. In this case, the standard errors from the second
step need to be corrected. In this study, we have corrected the standard errors by allowing
them to be heteroskedastic and autocorrelated of order 1.
6As Murphy and Topel (1985) show, the correct covariance matrix for the second-step
estimators exceeds the unadjusted covariance matrix by a positive-deﬁnite matrix. Therefore,
unadjusted standard errors are understated. In our case, and because in most cases we cannot
reject the null of insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients, this would imply that most of our coeﬃcient would
become even more insigniﬁcant.
7The industrialized economies are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States. The developing countries are Chile, Colom-
bia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Panama,
Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay and Venezuela.
10Table 2: Deﬁnitions and sources of the variables
Variables Series Sources
Private consumption Final Household Consumption Expenditure WDI
Government consumption General Final Govt. Consumption Expend. WDI
Total tax revenue Taxes on Income, Proﬁts and Capital Gains WDI
+ Social Security Taxes WDI
+ Net Taxes on Products WDI
Households disposable income GNI WDI
Gross domestic product GDP WDI
Disposable income deﬂator GDP Deﬂator WDI
Population Population, total WDI
Government bond yield Government Bond Yield IFS
Unemployment rate Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) WDI
The sources of the data are the World Development Indicators 2002 database of the World Bank
(WDI) and the International Financial Statistics 2002 database of the International Monetary
Fund (IFS). All the series are expressed in units of the local currency. For some countries, we
used the serie Taxes on Goods and Services (WDI) instead of Net Taxes on Products (WDI).
was used as proxy for L0 and D2t for p. In the ﬁrst deﬁnition, D1t, we used the
long term government bond yield to deﬁne bad times. Speciﬁcally, bad times
are those years t in which the bond yield in the previous period t − 1 is higher
than a certain threshold value x. The aforementioned value x is determined
individually for each country of the sample and corresponds, in the benchmark
case, to the eightieth percentile of the distribution for each country. As will be
seen in section 7, we will also take alternative values for D1t, equivalent to the
seventieth and ninetieth percentiles, in order corroborate our results obtained
in the benchmark case.
In second deﬁnition of bad times, D2t, we used the unemployment rate for
every country to deﬁne bad times. In this case, a given year t belongs to the
bad times regim if a country’s unemployment rate exceeds a certain value x
in the previous year t − 1. we use the same methodology for D2t as for D1t,
that is the seventieth, eightieth and ninetieth percentiles, where the eightieth
percentile also serves as the benchmark case. In table 3 of the appendix, we see
a list of the country-years that belong to the bad time regime according to the
deﬁnitions of D1t(.80), D1t(.90), D2t(.80), and D2t(.90).
6 Estimation Results
6.1 All the Countries in the Panel
Table 4 shows the estimates of equation (1) in columns (1) and (2), and of
equation (2) in columns (3) and (4) for all the countries in the sample. Thus,
the estimated coeﬃcients are the γi’s and ˜ γi’s in columns (1) and (2) and γu
i ’s
and ˜ γu
i ’s in columns (3) and (4). The diﬀerence between columns (1) and (2) is
11Table 3: Bad times
(1) (2) (3) (4)
D1t(.80) D1t(.90) D2t(.80) D2t(.90)
Australia 1981-1986 1981-1982, 1983, 1991- 1992-1993
1985 1993
Austria 1974-1976, 1974, 1981- 1986, 1996- 1996.1998
1980-1982 1982 1998
Belgium 1980-1985 1980-1982 1982-1984 1982, 1984
Canada 1980-1985 1981-1982, 1983-1984, 1983, 1993
1984 1992-1993
Chile 1982-1985 1982-1983
Colombia 1985, 1998- 1999-2000
2000
Costa Rica 1981-1983, 1982-1983
1985
Denmark 1974, 1978- 1980-1982 1981-1983, 1982, 1993
1982 1993
Dominican Republic 1992-1993 1992
Finland 1993-1996 1993-1994
France 1980-1985 1981-1983 1994, 1996- 1994, 1997
1997
Germany 1974, 1981- 1974, 1981 1997-1998 1997
1982, 1990-
1991
Greece 1996, 1998- 1999-2000
2000
Ireland 1974, 1976, 1974, 1981- 1985-1988 1986-1987
1979-1982 1982
Italy 1977, 1980- 1981-1983 1987-1989, 1988-1989
1984 1998





Morocco 1994-1995, 1995, 1999
1999
Netherlands 1974, 1976, 1980-1982 1983-1986 1983-1984
1980-1982,
1990
Norway 1982-1983, 1982, 1986- 1991-1994 1993
1985-1988 1987
Pakistan 1978-1983 1978-1980 1991, 1997 1991, 1997
Panama 1988-1991 1988-1989
Paraguay 1983-1984 1983, 1996
1990, 1996
Philippines 1987, 1998- 2000
2000
12Table 3 (continuation): Bad times
(1) (2) (3) (4)
D1t(.80) D1t(.90) D2t(.80) D2t(.90)
Portugal 1982-1985, 1983-1985 1983-1986 1985-1986
1990-1991
South Africa 1985-1986, 1985, 1988-
1988-1991 1989
Spain 1980-1984 1982-1984 1993-1996 1994-1995
Sri Lanka 1990, 1993 1993
Sweden 1981-1983, 1981, 1985, 1993-1994, 1996-1997
1985, 1990 1990 1996-1997
Thailand 1979-1982, 1979, 1981- 1985-1987, 1985, 1987
1984 1982 1998
Turkey 1982-1985 1983, 1984
United Kingdom 1974-1976, 1974, 1976, 1983-1986 1984
1979-1981 1981
United States 1980-1985 1981-1982, 1981-1983 1982-1983
1984
Uruguay 1986, 1999 1986, 1999
Venezuela 1994-1996, 1994-1995 1984-1985, 1985, 1999
1998 1996, 1999
Observations 120 61 128 66
In the ﬁrst deﬁnition of bad times, D1t, we use government bond yield to deﬁne
bad times. In second deﬁnition of bad times, D2t, we use the unemployment
rate to deﬁne bad times. Bad times are those years t in which the interest rate
or the unemployment rate in the previous period t − 1 is higher than a certain
threshold value x. x is determined individually for each country of the sample and
corresponds to the eightieth and ninetieth percentile of the distribution for each
country. In columns (1) and (3) we use the eightieth percentile and in columns (2)
and (4) we use the ninetieth percentile. In section 5 we discuss the construction
of the the bad times’s dummy variable.
13that the dummy variable used is D1t(.80) and D2t(.80) respectively. The same
apply to columns (3) and (4).
In columns (1) and (2) under the null hypothesis γ1 > 0, ˜ γ1 < 0, γ2 < 0, and
˜ γ2 > 0. Examining column (1), when the ﬁrst deﬁnition of bad times D1t(.80)
is used, we see than the only coeﬃcients that are consistent with the null hy-
pothesis are γ1 and γ2. The coeﬃcient for government consumption is 0.887 and
is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1%. Consequently, government con-
sumption shocks have Keynesian eﬀects on private consumption in good times.
Besides, ˜ γ1 is insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero and inconsistent with the null
hypothesis. As a consequence, there is no diﬀerence in the Keynesian eﬀects
between good and bad times. In the case of the tax shocks during good times,
the coeﬃcient γ2 is signiﬁcant at the 5% and take the value -0.235. Besides,
˜ γ2 is insigniﬁcant and not consistent with the null hypothesis. Therefore, tax
shocks have Keynesian eﬀects on private consumption during good times as well
as during bad times.
When using the second deﬁnition for bad times D2t(.80) in column (2),
the only signiﬁcant coeﬃcient is γ1 with a value equal to 0.676. Because ˜ γ1 is
insigniﬁcantly, government consumption shocks have Keynesian eﬀects in good
and bad times. On the other hand, both coeﬃcients of the tax variable are
insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Consequently, tax shocks have no eﬀects on
private consumption during good and bad times.
In the case of columns (3) and (4) the null hypothesis states that γu
1 < γ1,
˜ γu
1 = ˜ γ1 < 0, γu
2 > 0 > γ2, and ˜ γu
2 > ˜ γ2 > 0. Note that now the coeﬃcients of
the ﬁscal shocks depict only the eﬀects on unconstrained individuals. In column
(3) we see that the only coeﬃcients that are consistent with the null hypothesis
are γu
1 and γu
2. The coeﬃcient for government consumption is signiﬁcant and
has a value of 0.452, which is inferior to the value of γ1 (0.887). In addition, the
coeﬃcient γu
2, which reﬂects tax shocks in good times, is equal to -0.246 and
signiﬁcant at the 1%. The results of column (4) are also mostly inconsistent
with the null hypothesis. In this case, only the coeﬃcient for government con-
sumption shocks is signiﬁcant and equal to 0.597. The rest of the coeﬃcients
are insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent to zero.
In short, the results using the entire panel of countries seem not to be con-
sistent with the null hypothesis. Speciﬁcally, government consumption shocks
have Keynesian eﬀects in good times as well as in bad times. Also, the esti-
mates of the tax variable yield ambiguous results. When we deﬁne bad times
using the government bond yield, we ﬁnd that tax shocks have Keynesian eﬀects
during good and bad times. However, when we use the rate of unemployment,
the estimates show that tax shocks have no eﬀects on private consumption. In
addition, there is no evidence that supports the expansionary ﬁscal consolida-
tions hypothesis. Also, when comparing the results from equation (1) and (2),
we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the results. Thus, we conclude that
unconstrained and constrained individuals react in the same way on ﬁscal policy
shocks.
14Table 4: Estimates All Countries
Var. Coef. (1) (2) Coef. (3) (4)
ˆ 
G
t γ1 0.887 0.676 γ
u
1 0.452 0.597
(0.221)*** (0.177)*** (0.206)** (0.172)***
Dt∗ˆ 
G
t ˜ γ1 0.147 0.339 ˜ γ
u
1 0.135 0.103
(0.496) (0.422) (0.470) (0.402)
ˆ 
T
t γ2 -0.235 -0.056 γ
u
2 -0.246 -0.060
(0.093)** (0.095) (0.089)*** (0.090)
Dt∗ˆ 
T
t ˜ γ2 0.072 -0.081 ˜ γ
u
2 0.055 -0.150
(0.212) (0.199) (0.205) (0.179)
∆ˆ Y t/t−1 µ 0.492 0.364
(0.064)*** (0.075)***
∆ˆ Y t/t µ 0.540 0.472
(0.047)*** (0.052)***
Sample All All All All
No. observations 540 666 540 666
No. countries 21 37 21 37
R
2 0.294 0.171 0.401 0.274
Defn. of bad times D1t(.80) D2t(.80) D1t(.80) D2t(.80)
No. of bad times 120 128 120 128
Estimated using Prais-Winston regression assuming disturbances are heteroskedastic and con-
temporaneously correlated across panels, and allowing for panel-speciﬁc ﬁrst-order autocorre-
lation. All regressions include year dummies to account for any time-speciﬁc eﬀect, i.e. we
have a two-way error component regression model. Columns (1) and (2) display estimates
of equation (1). Columns (3) and (4) display estimates of equation (2). Standard errors in
parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10%;** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
156.2 Industrialized Countries
Table 5 shows the estimates of equations (1) and (2) for industrialized countries.
From column (1), we see that the only coeﬃcient that is signiﬁcant, is the one
for government consumption shocks, with a positive value of 0.561. All the
other coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero and, consequently, are
not according to the null hypothesis. In the case of column (2), when we use
the dummy variable D2t(.80), the results are similar to the results of column
(1). The coeﬃcient of government consumption shock is the only one that it
is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent to zero and consistent with the null hypothesis, with a
positive value of 0.308.
When considering the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy shocks on unconstrained indi-
viduals and using the dummy variable D1t(.80) (column 3), the results are also
mostly inconsistent with the null hypothesis. In this case, and like in columns
(1) and (2), only the government consumption shocks have signiﬁcant eﬀects on
private consumption. The estimate of γu
1 is signiﬁcant at the 5% and equal to
0.372, which is less than the estimate of γ1 (0.561). In addition, ˜ γu
1 is insigniﬁ-
cantly diﬀerent from zero, and thus there are no diﬀerence in the eﬀects of the
shocks during good times and bad times. In the case of the tax variables, both
coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent of zero. When using the second deﬁni-
tion of bad times (column (4)), all the coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero.
Concluding, the results for the industrial countries seem not to favor the null
hypothesis. The shocks in the consumption of the government have Keynesian
eﬀects, which is consistent with the null hypothesis. However, these Keynesian
eﬀects are not reverted in bad times, which is not in agreement with the null
hypothesis. Besides, in the case of the tax variable, the shocks seem not to
have any eﬀects on private consumption during good and bad times. On the
other hand, when comparing the estimates of equations (1) and (2), we did not
ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the results. Thus, there is no evidence that ﬁscal
policy shocks aﬀect diﬀerently unconstrained and constrained individuals. As a
consequence, we conclude that ﬁscal policy have not non-Keynesian eﬀects on
private consumption.
If we compare the results of tables 4 and 5 for the dummy variable D1t(.80)
(columns (1) and (3)), we see that the coeﬃcient γ2 is signiﬁcant for the sample
of all countries and insigniﬁcant when only considering industrial countries.8
Therefore, we can conclude that the estimation results of γ2, when using the
sample of all countries, is signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by the eﬀects of the developing
countries. In other words, the eﬀects of tax shocks change from not having any
eﬀect, when using the sample of industrial countries, to having Keynesian eﬀects,
when adding four developing countries to the sample of industrial countries.
8Note that the diﬀerence between this two samples are four countries. The sample of all
countries consists of the sample of industrial countries plus Pakistan, South Africa, Thailand
and Venezuela.
16Table 5: Estimates Industrial Countries
Var. Coef. (1) (2) Coef. (3) (4)
ˆ 
G
t γ1 0.561 0.308 γ
u
1 0.372 0.301
(0.179)*** (0.154)** (0.180)** (0.157)*
Dt∗ˆ 
G
t ˜ γ1 -0.146 -0.080 ˜ γ
u
1 -0.127 -0.152
(0.318) (0.307) (0.316) (0.313)
ˆ 
T
t γ2 0.019 0.054 γ
u
2 0.024 0.062
(0.058) (0.056) (0.050) (0.057)
Dt∗ˆ 
T
t ˜ γ2 -0.106 -0.049 ˜ γ
u
2 -0.103 -0.082
(0.161) (0.092) (0.144) (0.097)
∆ˆ Y t/t−1 µ 0.433 0.332
(0.065)*** (0.059)***
∆ˆ Y t/t µ 0.335 0.230
(0.052)*** (0.048)***
Sample Indust Indust Indust Indust
No. observations 446 368 446 368
No. countries 17 19 17 19
R
2 0.325 0.333 0.321 0.304
Defn. of bad times D1t(.80) D2t(.80) D1t(.80) D2t(.80)
No. of bad times 99 70 99 70
Estimated using Prais-Winston regression assuming disturbances are heteroskedastic and con-
temporaneously correlated across panels, and allowing for panel-speciﬁc ﬁrst-order autocorre-
lation. All regressions include year dummies to account for any time-speciﬁc eﬀect, i.e. we
have a two-way error component regression model. Columns (1) and (2) display estimates
of equation (1). Columns (3) and (4) display estimates of equation (2). Standard errors in
parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10%;** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
176.3 Developing Countries
The results of estimating equations (1) and (2) for developing countries are
presented in table 6. Unlike tables 4 and 5, we use only the dummy variable
D2t(.80) since there is no available data for constructing dummy variable D1t
for developing countries.9 Column (1) shows that the shocks on government
consumption have a positive eﬀect on private consumption, with a signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient equal to 0.790. However, the estimates of ˜ γ1 and the tax variables
are insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. When we analyze the wealth eﬀects on
the unconstrained individuals (column (2)), we obtain similar results to those
in column (1), i.e. only γu
1 is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. In this case,
the coeﬃcient equals 0.697 and is consistent with the null hypothesis since it is
inferior to γ1.
Concluding, the estimation results for the developing countries do not favor
the null hypothesis. Government consumption shocks have Keynesian eﬀects on
private consumption during good times as well as bad times. In the case of tax
shocks, they do not have any eﬀects on private consumption during either good
times or bad times. Besides, the estimation results of equations (1) and (2)
are similar, which indicate that the ﬁscal policy shocks do not aﬀect diﬀerently
unconstrained and constrained individuals. Therefore, we obtain evidence that
reject the expansionary ﬁscal contraction hypothesis.
Additionally, the results obtained for the developing countries using dummy
variable D2t(.80), are practically equivalent to the ones obtained for the in-
dustrial countries. Note, however, that the coeﬃcients γ1 and γu
1 are larger
when using the sample of developing countries. Therefore, we can conclude
that government consumption shocks have a larger Keynesian eﬀect on private
consumption in developing countries than in industrial countries. This result is
intuitive, and is in accordance with the theoretical model, if we consider that
there is a larger proportion of constrained individuals in developing countries.
7 Consistency Tests
In order to conﬁrm that the benchmark case results in section 6 are robust, we
estimated equations (1) and (2) using alternative deﬁnitions of bad times. For
both dummy variables, D1t and D2t, we used two diﬀerent values to deﬁne bad
times. Speciﬁcally, we used the value of the seventieth and ninetieth percentile
of the distribution for each country to deﬁne bad times.
The results for the sample of all the countries can be seen in table 7, where we
see that the results of the estimations are very similar. The only diﬀerence is for
the coeﬃcient γu
1 when using the ﬁrst deﬁnition of bad times D1t. In this case,
the coeﬃcient goes from being signiﬁcant in column (7) to being insigniﬁcant in
column (8), when using D1t(.70). However, the coeﬃcient is still signiﬁcant if
we enlarge the conﬁdence level to the 10%. Moreover, when using D1t(.90) in
9Speciﬁcally, there is only data for Pakistan, South Africa, Thailand and Venezuela.
18Table 6: Estimates Developing Countries
Var. Coef. (1) Coef. (2)
ˆ 
G






















∆ˆ Y t/t−1 µ 0.351
(0.077)***
∆ˆ Y t/t µ 0.493
(0.054)***
Sample Dev Dev
No. observations 298 298
No. countries 18 18
R
2 0.290 0.320
Defn. of bad times D2t(.80) D2t(.80)
No. of bad times 58 58
Estimated using Prais-Winston regression assuming disturbances are
heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated across panels, and
allowing for panel-speciﬁc ﬁrst-order autocorrelation. All regressions
include year dummies to account for any time-speciﬁc eﬀect, i.e. we
have a two-way error component regression model. Column (1) dis-
plays estimates of equation (1). Column (2) displays estimates of
equation (2). Standard errors in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10%;**
signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
19Table 7: Other deﬁnitions of bad times for all countries
Var. Coef. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D1t(.80) D1t(.70) D1t(.90) D2t(.80) D2t(.70) D2t(.90)
ˆ 
G
t γ1 0.887 0.817 0.893 0.676 0.687 0.794
(0.221)*** (0.233)*** (0.209)*** (0.177)*** (0.181)*** (0.171)***
Dt∗ˆ 
G
t ˜ γ1 0.147 0.358 0.229 0.339 0.231 -0.509
(0.496) (0.452) (0.665) (0.422) (0.361) (0.589)
ˆ 
T
t γ2 -0.235 -0.244 -0.238 -0.056 -0.052 -0.024
(0.093)** (0.104)** (0.085)*** (0.095) (0.102) (0.087)
Dt∗ˆ 
T
t ˜ γ2 0.072 0.089 0.138 -0.081 -0.077 -0.321
(0.212) (0.173) (0.282) (0.199) (0.179) (0.248)
∆ˆ Y t/t−1 µ 0.492 0.491 0.491 0.364 0.362 0.361
(0.064)*** (0.064)*** (0.063)*** (0.075)*** (0.075)*** (0.075)***
Sample All All All All All All
No. obser-
vations
540 540 540 666 666 666
No. coun-
tries
21 21 21 37 37 37
R
2 0.294 0.297 0.295 0.171 0.170 0.176
No. of bad
times
120 178 61 128 197 66
Estimated using Prais-Winston regression assuming disturbances are heteroskedastic and con-
temporaneously correlated across panels, and allowing for panel-speciﬁc ﬁrst-order autocorre-
lation. All regressions include year dummies to account for any time-speciﬁc eﬀect, i.e. we
have a two-way error component regression model. Columns (1) to (6) display estimates of
equation (1). Columns (7) to (12) display estimates of equation (2). See section 7 for alterna-
tive deﬁnitions of bad times. Standard errors in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10%;** signiﬁcant
at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
column (9), the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 5%. Therefore, we conclude that
the consistency test lead us to accept the conclusions from the benchmark case.
When only using the sample of industrial countries (table 8) and using the
alternative deﬁnitions of bad times, we see that the majority of the results
do not change. Concretely, the signiﬁcance of coeﬃcients γ1 and γu
1 are the
only changes. In the case of γ1, we see than when we use deﬁnition D2t(.70),
it becomes insigniﬁcant (column (5)). However, it continues being signiﬁcant
when we use deﬁnition D2t(.90) (column (6)). Besides, from column (8), γu
1
reduces its signiﬁcance level from 5% to 10% when using the dummy variable
D1t(.70). In addition, when using the second deﬁnition of bad times D2t(.90)
in column (12), the coeﬃcient becomes signiﬁcant at the 5%. Concluding, there
is some evidence that the signiﬁcance of γ1 and γu
1 is not completely robust for
industrial countries.
For the sample of developing countries (table 9), the results from the bench-
mark case are practically corroborated in the consistency test. The only diﬀer-
ence with the benchmark case can be seen in column (6) for γu
2. In this case,
the coeﬃcient becomes signiﬁcant at the 5% with a value of -0.747.
20Table 7 (continuation): Other deﬁnitions of bad times for all countries
Var. Coef. (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)





1 0.452 0.385 0.456 0.597 0.606 0.662





1 0.135 0.329 0.252 0.103 0.050 -0.569





2 -0.246 -0.259 -0.239 -0.060 -0.060 -0.033





2 0.055 0.091 0.029 -0.150 -0.118 -0.395
(0.205) (0.172) (0.280) (0.179) (0.162) (0.216)*
∆ˆ Y t/t µ 0.540 0.540 0.540 0.472 0.471 0.474
(0.047)*** (0.047)*** (0.047)*** (0.052)*** (0.052)*** (0.051)***
Sample All All All All All All
No. obser-
vations
540 540 540 666 666 666
No. coun-
tries
21 21 21 37 37 37
R
2 0.401 0.403 0.401 0.274 0.273 0.285
No. of bad
times
120 178 61 128 197 66
Estimated using Prais-Winston regression assuming disturbances are heteroskedastic and con-
temporaneously correlated across panels, and allowing for panel-speciﬁc ﬁrst-order autocorre-
lation. All regressions include year dummies to account for any time-speciﬁc eﬀect, i.e. we
have a two-way error component regression model. Columns (1) to (6) display estimates of
equation (1). Columns (7) to (12) display estimates of equation (2). See section 7 for alterna-
tive deﬁnitions of bad times. Standard errors in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10%;** signiﬁcant
at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
21Table 8: Other deﬁnitions of bad times for industrial countries
Var. Coef. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D1t(.80) D1t(.70) D1t(.90) D2t(.80) D2t(.70) D2t(.90)
ˆ 
G
t γ1 0.561 0.505 0.553 0.308 0.241 0.329
(0.179)*** (0.192)*** (0.168)*** (0.154)** (0.167) (0.149)**
Dt∗ˆ 
G
t ˜ γ1 -0.146 0.003 -0.223 -0.080 0.136 -0.362
(0.318) (0.308) (0.380) (0.307) (0.256) (0.500)
ˆ 
T
t γ2 0.019 0.024 0.018 0.054 0.057 0.021
(0.058) (0.061) (0.054) (0.056) (0.058) (0.052)
Dt∗ˆ 
T
t ˜ γ2 -0.106 -0.091 -0.159 -0.049 -0.045 0.082
(0.161) (0.125) (0.199) (0.092) (0.080) (0.111)
∆ˆ Y t/t−1 µ 0.433 0.433 0.431 0.332 0.333 0.334
(0.065)*** (0.065)*** (0.065)*** (0.059)*** (0.059)*** (0.059)***
Sample Indust Indust Indust Indust Indust Indust
No. obser-
vations
446 446 446 368 368 368
No. coun-
tries
17 17 17 19 19 19
R
2 0.325 0.327 0.325 0.333 0.332 0.339
No. of bad
times
99 148 50 70 110 35
Estimated using Prais-Winston regression assuming disturbances are heteroskedastic and con-
temporaneously correlated across panels, and allowing for panel-speciﬁc ﬁrst-order autocorre-
lation. All regressions include year dummies to account for any time-speciﬁc eﬀect, i.e. we
have a two-way error component regression model. Columns (1) to (6) display estimates of
equation (1). Columns (7) to (12) display estimates of equation (2). See section 7 for alterna-
tive deﬁnitions of bad times. Standard errors in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10%;** signiﬁcant
at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
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Var. Coef. (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)





1 0.372 0.323 0.359 0.301 0.252 0.305





1 -0.127 -0.000 -0.124 -0.152 0.040 -0.345





2 0.024 0.026 0.030 0.062 0.067 0.022





2 -0.103 -0.076 -0.216 -0.082 -0.076 0.069
(0.144) (0.114) (0.188) (0.097) (0.084) (0.113)
∆ˆ Y t/t µ 0.335 0.335 0.336 0.230 0.229 0.228
(0.052)*** (0.052)*** (0.052)*** (0.048)*** (0.048)*** (0.048)***
Sample Indust Indust Indust Indust Indust Indust
No. obser-
vations
446 446 446 368 368 368
No. coun-
tries
17 17 17 19 19 19
R
2 0.321 0.320 0.324 0.304 0.304 0.306
No. of bad
times
99 148 50 70 110 35
Estimated using Prais-Winston regression assuming disturbances are heteroskedastic and con-
temporaneously correlated across panels, and allowing for panel-speciﬁc ﬁrst-order autocorre-
lation. All regressions include year dummies to account for any time-speciﬁc eﬀect, i.e. we
have a two-way error component regression model. Columns (1) to (6) display estimates of
equation (1). Columns (7) to (12) display estimates of equation (2). See section 7 for alterna-
tive deﬁnitions of bad times. Standard errors in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10%;** signiﬁcant
at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
23Table 9: Other deﬁnitions of bad times for developing countries
Var. Coef. (1) (2) (3) Coef. (4) (5) (6)
D2t(.80) D2t(.70) D2t(.90) D2t(.80) D2t(.70) D2t(.90)
ˆ 
G
t γ1 0.790 0.804 0.932 γ
u
1 0.697 0.700 0.776
(0.170)*** (0.177)*** (0.165)*** (0.172)*** (0.180)*** (0.167)***
Dt∗ˆ 
G
t ˜ γ1 0.526 0.380 -0.478 ˜ γ
u
1 0.320 0.255 -0.439
(0.469) (0.420) (0.586) (0.440) (0.403) (0.544)
ˆ 
T
t γ2 -0.178 -0.186 -0.119 γ
u
2 -0.174 -0.185 -0.114
(0.140) (0.152) (0.130) (0.137) (0.148) (0.127)
Dt∗ˆ 
T
t ˜ γ2 -0.198 -0.147 -0.652 ˜ γ
u
2 -0.277 -0.200 -0.747
(0.276) (0.265) (0.337)* (0.253) (0.236) (0.309)**
∆ˆ Y t/t−1 µ 0.351 0.348 0.352
(0.077)*** (0.077)*** (0.073)***
∆ˆ Y t/t µ 0.493 0.494 0.498
(0.054)*** (0.055)*** (0.051)***
Sample Dev Dev Dev Dev Dev Dev
No. obser-
vations
298 298 298 298 298 298
No. coun-
tries
18 18 18 18 18 18
R
2 0.290 0.206 0.221 0.320 0.318 0.336
No. of bad
times
58 87 31 58 87 31
Estimated using Prais-Winston regression assuming disturbances are heteroskedastic and con-
temporaneously correlated across panels, and allowing for panel-speciﬁc ﬁrst-order autocorre-
lation. All regressions include year dummies to account for any time-speciﬁc eﬀect, i.e. we
have a two-way error component regression model. Columns (1) to (3) display estimates of
equation (1). Columns (4) to (6) display estimates of equation (2). See section 7 for alternative
deﬁnitions of bad times. Standard errors in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10%;** signiﬁcant at
5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
248 Conclusions
The results from the estimations indicate that government consumption shocks
have Keynesian eﬀects on private consumption in industrial and developing
countries. In addition, these Keynesian eﬀects are not reverted in bad times.
In the case of the tax shocks, the evidence suggest that they do not have any
eﬀects on private consumption either in good times or bad times. This result is
conﬁrmed for both industrial and developing countries. Accordingly, we show
that the composition of ﬁscal policy shocks is crucial for stimulating private
consumption. Contrary to the common belief that expenditure cuts, instead of
tax increases, is crucial for a favorable macroeconomic outcome, we claim that
the opposite is true. Further, we do not ﬁnd that initial conditions are impor-
tant in determining the outcome of ﬁscal policy. Thus, there is no evidence that
favor the expansionary ﬁscal consolidation hypothesis (non-Keynesian eﬀects).
Finally, we ﬁnd that government consumption shocks have a larger Keynesian
eﬀect on private consumption in developing countries than in industrial coun-
tries. This result is intuitive, and is in accordance with the theoretical model
introduced in section 3, if we consider that there is a larger proportion of con-
strained individuals in developing countries.
When comparing our results with the results of Schclarek (2003), we get iden-
tical results for the case of government consumption shocks, both for industrial
and developing countries. In the case of tax shocks, we obtain only coincidences
for industrial countries. Schclarek (2003) ﬁnds that tax shocks do not have
any eﬀects for industrial countries, but, and unlike us, ﬁnds Keynesian eﬀects
for developing countries. When comparing our results for industrial countries
with Perotti (1999), we ﬁnd markedly diﬀerences. He ﬁnds that the shocks in
government consumption and taxes have Keynesian eﬀects during good times,
but non-Keynesian eﬀects during bad times. However, he also ﬁnds that the
composition of ﬁscal policy is important. With regards to the other surveyed
papers, our results are in line with Giavazzi et al. (2000), Hjelm (2002b) and
van Aarle and Garretsen (2003) in the sense that initial conditions, with the
exception of preceding depreciations, are not important. Moreover, our results
regarding the rejection of the expansionary ﬁscal consolidation hypothesis are
in line with Hjelm (2002a), Hjelm (2002b), van Aarle and Garretsen (2003) and
Schclarek (2003).
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